Punic Wars

                        There was a balance of power in the western Mediterranean around 264 BC like before WWI in Europe. As in Europe in 1914, this balance of power did not stand up to empire building pressures. An assassination in Sarajevo, or restless puny Greek city-state of Messana – both were the cause of a long drawn war, with inconclusive peace and with a determined man in the defeated nation to “right the  wrongs” and to continue the conflict...

View of the remains of the temple of Saturn, otherwise known as the
State Treasury. It has two underground stories.

1st Punic War

                   Carthage in north Africa (today close to the capital of Tunisia) was founded according to tradition around 750 BC by Phoenician settlers. Called ‘Puni’ by the Greeks and later Romans, they were very business minded and built up a mercantile empire in the western Mediterranean, with attending naval expertise. Rome and Carthage had few problems between them because each had its own spheres of interest. While Rome was busy staying above the water under constant attacks from about everybody in Italy, Carthage was exploring naval routes, trolling for business and crucifying pirates to everybody’s applause.

Carthaginian empire before wars with Rome

             Carthaginians founded trading colonies all over western Mediterranean and ruled over northern Africa from Libya to Gibraltar, part of Spain, whole Corsica and Sardinia, and nearly half of Sicily as well. Carthaginians did not like Pyrrhus (he had some notions and adventures in Sicily) and supported Rome in its defense against him. But there was a fundamental weakness in the empire building Carthaginian drive. They forced others – tribes and city-states – to pay taxes to them, but had no interest to integrate them into their system. No ‘Friends and Allies of Carthage’ existed, no graduated citizenship held as carrot for the future, and also no loyalty to Carthage, only subservience.

            The initial cause of Roman – Carthaginian conflict involved convoluted Greek politics in Sicily. Campanian mercenaries took over the city-state of Messana. Syracusan king Hiero wanted to oust them. The mercenaries appealed to a Carthaginian fleet.  Carthaginians helped, however they decided they want to keep Messana for Carthage and stayed. Messanians, or rather the mercenary rulers of Messana appealed for help to the Roman Senate. Roman Senate decided to do nothing. They did not want to tangle with the most powerful navy in the Mediterranean, especially since Rome had no navy. Not to mention they were not at all sympathetic to the Campanian mercenaries.

           The younger and less staid faction in the Roman Senate brought the Messanian request before the Popular Assembly, in the person Appius Claudius Caudex, grandson of the stubborn consul and censor from preceding chapter. Honed in the new art of persuasion, imported from southern Italy, he managed to convince the Assembly that they should help the Messanians. Thus proving, that the people generally, represented by the Assembly, were not bent on peace and brotherly love, as is commonly held by intellectuals today.  The 1^st Punic War could start. Caudex led an army to Sicily, where he handily defeated Carthaginian garrison and the Syracusans, who allied themselves with the Carthaginians.

            Most of Carthaginian ships were in storage; they had to be refitted and crews hired and trained. This did not inspire confidence in the Syracusan king Hiero, because the most powerful navy in his world could not even prevent Romans from ferrying an army over the Strait of Messana to Sicily. He speedily signed a peace treaty with Rome for next 15 years and on top of it he helped the Romans with logistical support and with capturing some Carthaginian forts.

           Of course, the fleet was going to be a problem. Eventually, the Carthaginians would refit their warships and without their own navy, the Romans could not hope to prevent the Carthaginians raiding Italy with impunity. The triremes hired from the Greek city-states were somewhat helpful, but the latest in the naval warfare were quinqueremes, with five (quinque) men to an oar, and it was a heavy ship with proper heft behind the bronze beak just beneath the surface to ram enemy ships.

            Romans had one quinquereme, which they captured or found on the shore and in sixty days had one hundred of them built. This also meant that they had to build some simulators on land to train crews. Realising, after some unfortunate encounters with the Carthaginian navy that they need more advantage than speed in building, Romans invented the corvus (raven) – a large gangplank with a hook at the end to board enemy ship and to allow legionaries to do what they did best – to fight as if on land.

Qunquiereme

            In 260 BC a great naval battle took place not far from Messana, where the Roman navy defeated the Carthaginian navy, and took the beaks of the captured ships to decorate the Speakers platform in the Forum Romanum to prove to the Assembly, that the war was a good idea. In 258 BC the Carthaginian navy went down, that is down to the bottom, off the coast of Sardinia before the Roman fleet. Carthaginian council was so enraged that its commander was crucified. 

Diagram of corvus

            Many historians are puzzled that during that titanic, many years lasting struggle, the Carthaginians with all their naval expertise did not manage to develop a counter measure to the corvus.  Possibly the fact, that only the officer corps consisted of Carthaginians and the rest were mercenaries had something to do with it. They were hired to fight, not to think. Or they were more aware than the nautically reckless Romans that the heavy corvus, fastened to the mast, destabilised ships in stormy weather and they thought they’d  let nature take care of the Roman tactics.

            The Romans became very cocky. They decided to bring the war to northern Africa. M. Atilius Regulus received command for the invasion. This went bad in its entirety. Carthage hired a Spartan mercenary, Xanthippus, as a general, and his tactics defeated the Roman army in 255 BC. Roman fleet saved the remnants of Regulus’ army, but the fleet was partially destroyed by a storm and the captured consul Regulus was executed.

            After that, the main theatre of operations remained Sicily, from where the Carthaginians were previously thrown out. Since they did not believe in allies, only in subjugation, the minute Carthage was in trouble, the subjected peoples in Africa and Spain revolted, and Carthaginians spent a lot of time and energy to bring them back into the fold; or under the fold.

                In 249 BC happened an incident that served as a warning example and oratorical exercise on the dangers of impiety for generations of middle school boys. Publius Claudius Pulcher of the maverick Claudius family was elected to consulship and received the command of the fleet. Before a battle, every commander was supposed to see if the sacred chickens would eat, and thus prophesy success or failure in battle.  Chickens eating eagerly suggested success. If they were off their feed, commanders had to wait for another opportunity for battle. Well, the chickens did not want to eat that time and the consul threw them overboard, yelling “if they won’t eat, let them drink!’ He lost the battle, and the fleet.

             Irreverent people suggested though, that his defeat was caused rather by poor tactics than by wayward chickens. The same irreverent people hauled him to court on charges of incompetence and impiety, a handy charge. He was convicted and heavily fined, because Romans did not believe in killing bad commanders, rather making money off of them to compensate for losses caused by them.

Hamilcar Barca

            From then on, the war went badly for Rome. An excellent Carthaginian officer, Hamilcar Barca in command of 20 thousand mercenaries was dispatched to Sicily, and started to press the Romans back. The Romans had no more navies after the defeats in 249, whoever was to blame, chickens or bad commanders. Carthaginian navy regained its status and was able to supply the mercenaries in Sicily.

            Romans realised that their only chance for victory lay in the recovery of their naval power. However, there was no money for ships. Actually, for anything, the treasury under the temple of Saturn, the ancient god of wealth, was empty.  Rome’s doggedness and sheer pigheadedness (politely called perseverance) showed a way. Senators lined up on the Speakers platform in the Forum, since the 1^st Punic war called the Rostra (ships' beaks), and asked citizens to lend money to the state. The consuls went ahead with all their own silver first as an example. In 242 BC 200 Roman ships arrived to Sicily. On a stormy morning they destroyed the Carthaginian fleet. The Carthaginian army in Sicily could no longer be supplied and the war was over. Carthage did not have another navy.

Carthage in 3rd cent. AD- note the excellent harbour

              Hamilcar Barca negotiated the peace treaty in 241 BC. Romans were well aware that their victory was a very close thing and did not press for severe terms.  However, whatever the terms, Sicily was henceforward Roman, the first Roman province outside of Italy proper. 

           

            Carthage was beset by other problems than mere loss of naval supremacy (never regained) and an indemnity to be paid to Rome.  They could not pay off the mercenaries who returned from Sicily and wanted their paycheck. Carthaginians did not have the money, so the mercenaries did, what they knew best – fought for it. With Carthage.

Carthaginian sacrificial altar. Romans were not fond of
the Carthaginians not only because of the war, but
because the Carthaginians practiced child sacrifices as well.
This fact was confirmed by archaeology.